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Introduction
Current economic expansions into the marine realm reiterates
calls, first heard in the mid-2000s, to coordinate action
through Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) (Douvere 2008;
Douvere and Ehler 2009; Crowder et al. 2006; Foley et al.
2010; Halpern et al. 2008). The European Commission, for
example, has high expectations of MSP’s contribution to
boosting the Blue Growth agenda by its potential use in iden-
tifying space for new economic activities and synergies
(EASME 2018). Also, long-standing calls for conservation
and protection of our oceans’ ecological riches are increasing-
ly effectuated through spatial measures, including a wide-
spread commitment to establish Marine Protected Areas
(MPAs) both in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and at
high seas (Ardron et al. 2008; Agardy 2010; Foley et al.
2010). Marine ecological interconnectivity is however a main
cause for complexity in planning economic activities at sea
and in balancing socioeconomic interests with conservation
needs (Crowder and Norse 2008).
At the same time, ocean governance, especially in
transboundary areas, is complicated by institutional fragmen-
tation, and/or institutional ambiguity, the first referring to frag-
mentation in roles and responsibilities of institutions, policies,
and regulations and the latter to “the mismatch between insti-
tutions of the different policy-making settings which come
together” (Van Leeuwen et al. 2012: 637; Jay et al. 2013;
Raakjær and van Tatenhove 2014; van Tatenhove 2013,
2016, 2017). Navigating the complexity of transboundary
MSP (TMSP) depends on actors’ abilities to understand and
influence the rules of governing and dominant policy dis-
courses. Moreover, governance arrangements tasked with, or
designed for, planning in transboundary contexts should foster
reflexivity, providing room for these actors to jointly (re-)
examine courses of action, and formulate new logics which
might fall outside dominant regimes and discourses (Beck
2006; Feindt and Weiland 2018; van Tatenhove 2017).
In allocating space for marine uses and the marine environ-
ment, MSP is presented as an important tool that will facilitate
decision-making processes. Dominant definitions refer to
MSP as “the rational organization of the use of marine space
and the interactions between its uses, to balance demands for
development” (Douvere 2008: 766); and to “a public process
of analyzing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribu-
tion of human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological,
economic, and social objectives that usually have been spec-
ified through a political process” (Ehler and Douvere 2009:
18). While these definitions do not automatically preclude
reflexivity, common interpretation in academia and policy
practice emphasizes ordered and rational action, and refers
to national governments as responsible for directing the public
process (van Tatenhove 2017). In such a paradigm, the extent
to which MSP can become reflexive largely depends on the
capabilities of the state to engage in deliberative and informa-
tional processes. We find this problematic: first and foremost,
we argue that governance-by-government is always
complemented by networked forms of governance, particular-
ly in transboundary marine areas (van Tatenhove 2013). A
better focus on informational flows is needed to identify and
analyze MSP as a process of (re-) constructing and shaping
marine reality, but such flows are not just governed by states
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(Gray 2018; Lamers et al. 2016; Toonen and Bush 2018;
Toonen and van Tatenhove 2013). We claim that market
parties, environmental non-governmental organizations
(eNGOs), and other non-state actors also play a crucial role
as they have capabilities that enable them tomove information
(separate, with or next to money and goods) across traditional
(state) borders (cf. Sassen 2013). To gain better insights into
the opportunities of a broad range of actors (including the
state) to develop capabilities relevant for reflexive TMSP,
research and policy initiatives should be developed beyond
the state. Another important problem is that ordered and ratio-
nal approaches of MSP neglect issues of specific distributive
impacts and power dynamics (Flannery et al. 2016).
To overcome the shortcomings of a state-dominated, ratio-
nal approach to MSP, we argue that TMSP should be (re-)
conceptualized as a process of marine scaping (Toonen and
van Tatenhove 2013). Marine scaping puts informational
processes—rather than state authority—at the center of anal-
ysis of MSP. By building upon our earlier work, and that of
other (environmental) sociologists, we aim to show that ma-
rine scaping sheds light on how reflexivity in TMSP comes
about. We illustrate our argument with two examples from the
tropical part of the world’s oceans, the Tropical Eastern
Pacific Ocean, and the Tropical Atlantic Ocean. These tropical
oceans provide us with an interesting empirical frontier: MSP,
when defined in its usual terms, is close to non-existent in
these areas (Paddle project/Bonnin n.d.; Jay et al. 2013;
IOC-UNESCO 2019). Ecological values and socio-
economic interests seem however high for state and non-
state actors from all over the world. Consequently, it is not
clear who is in charge of reconciling marine conservation with
ocean use, leaving room for a diverse set of actors to exercise
their capabilities to change the ways in which marine space is
governed.
Marine scaping and reflexivity
Thinking of (T)MSP as reflexive governance for dealing with
spatio-environmental challenges at sea implies that it is
underpinned by processes of political modernization (Arts
and van Tatenhove 2006). The marine realm is especially a
space in which many forms of multi-level and multi-actor
governance prevail, following from the relatively limited ju-
risdiction for nation states in the high seas, as stipulated by the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
(Bush and Mol 2015; Van Tatenhove 2013, 2016). Reflexive
governance implies (re-) invention of political practices out-
side the dominant political system (Voß et al. 2006), which in
the realm of transboundary oceans and seas is typically char-
acterized by high institutional fragmentation (Raakjaer et al.
2014; van Tatenhove 2017; Van Tatenhove 2013). Also, re-
flexive governance is grounded in processes of deliberation
and learning, wherein (new) information is the key resource
for actors (cf. Beck 2006; Feindt and Weiland 2018).
Information is in particular crucial for marine governance,
due to the many knowledge gaps and uncertainties about the
functioning of marine ecosystems, and marine biological pro-
cesses. Also, environmental issues and spatial challenges re-
main largely out of sight, so information, often to be generated
through advanced systems and technologies, is thus needed to
illuminate what is happening where and when, by whom and
how (Fairbanks et al. 2018; St. Martin and Hall-Arber 2008;
Mol 2008; Toonen and Mol 2016; Toonen and Bush 2018).
The need to scrutinize information in governance processes
is well-explained by Bullock (2017). By drawing on
Foucault’s “in knowing we control and in controlling we
know”, he states that “As its means of communication, infor-
mation is central to this power of knowledge. Information
represents an individual’s ability to translate tacit, internalized
knowledge into explicit, articulated words and symbols that
can influence the knowledge and actions of others” (Bullock
2017: 17). In this understanding, information should not be
perceived as an empty carrier, but as a mediator with power,
that finds its way into different knowledge frames and
decision-making processes. Mol (2006, 2008) concurs by
explaining that informational flows are particularly formative
in processes of environmental governance. In organizing and
coordinating activities that result in a strong(er) potential to
exploit marine resources (e.g. Blue Economy) and more ef-
fective marine conservation, new and incoming information
does indeed not only affect the substance of environmental
decision-making. Given the characteristics of today’s
Information Age, such as the rise of a high-tech global econ-
omy, an increasing democratization of knowledge, yet also the
digital divide and loss of scientific authority, informational
flows can, and do, change power balances between actors
(Mol 2008; Bullock 2017). Focus on the central role of infor-
mation and related changes allow for a better understanding of
whose authorities and territories are not just dominant but also
meaningful for deliberation and leaning about (new) logics
and courses of action.
Due to the fragmented and highly dynamic institutional
setting, rule-making at sea needs to be conceptualized in a
way that territorialization is not automatically coupled to the
nation state (Campbell et al. 2016; Jay 2018; Havice and Zalik
2018; Lamers et al. 2016; van Tatenhove 2016, 2017; Toonen
and Bush 2018). This argument finds support in spatial and
social theory alike, yet we draw predominately on the latter.
Both schools of thought are influential in MSP studies, and
moving towards each other in terms of ontology—particularly
critical scholars find common ground in their call for a recon-
ceptualization ofMSP (Clarke and Flannery 2019; Ritchie and
Ellis 2010; Fairbanks et al. 2018; Flannery et al. 2016; Jay
2012, 2018, 2019; Tafon 2018). While we do not want to
promote separating the spatial and the social, acknowledging
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the different vantage points helps to highlight different aspects
of MSP as a governance process and allows to develop and
discuss new conceptualizations. Spatial theory centers around
the rethinking of the notion of space, such as Jay who reframes
space “from soft to lively” (Jay 2018) and emphasizes a spatial
dialect between “the striated and the smooth” (Jay 2019), so
advocating for a more constructivist, relational, and flexible
understanding of MSP. This is fully in line with our ontology,
but we argue that social theorists can provide interesting in-
sights because for them, the concept of space is not the key
issue at stake. Starting questions are rather “who and how”, in
order to analyze why social structures and interactions (can)
bring about change, which in our case refers to creating more
reflexivity in TMSP.
The analytical framework used in this paper is based on our
earlier work on marine scaping, yet here complemented and
refined with ideas about reflexivity and capabilities. We have
suggested marine scaping as a conceptual approach to analyze
stability and change in arrangements in which information is
key as resource and/or governing mechanism for decision-
making about spatial claims and conflicts at sea (Toonen and
Van Tatenhove 2013). For a full description, we refer to our
2013 paper, yet here, we shortly explain the key elements: scap-
ing, scapes, information, and Archer’s morphogenetic approach
to capture the interplay between structure and agency (cf.
Archer 2010a; Archer 2012; Appadurai 1996; Verrips 1988).
Marine scaping is the staging and ordering of maritime
activities in space and time as the result of the interrelations
between seascape, humanscape, and mindscape—which to-
gether make an overlapping, disjunctive order. The three
scapes are analytically separated to be able to explicitly con-
nect information (its substance, quantity, formats, processes of
collection, processing, and use) to the physical environment
and the spatial interactions between users and the environment
(interplay seascape-humanscape, in Archer’s terms “structural
conditioning”); and at the same time, to open up normative
and ideological notions on both maritime and informational
practices (interplay mindscape-humanscape, in Archer’s
terms “cultural conditioning”; see Fig. 1).
Conceptually, MSP can be defined as marine scaping: it is
a process of constructing and shaping marine reality in space
and time, where relations between seascapes, humanscapes
and mindscapes, at a specific moment in time, are the result
of earlier day-to-day interactions between human activities at
sea. Information makes these interactions visible, legible, un-
derstandable, and thereby governable (Toonen and Bush
2018), and allow them to become stabilized in institutional
rules. In other words, marine scaping is the result of the inter-
play of agency and structure in a specific setting. In general,
agency refers to individual or group abilities to affect physical,
economic, and sociocultural environments, whereas structure
refers to the material and ideational conditions, which define
the range of actions available to actors. To capture dynamics
and change of marine scaping in terms of agency and structure
we have drawn onArcher’s morphogenetic approach (Toonen
and van Tatenhove 2013). Archer’s morphogenetic approach
consists of cycles of changes that can be summarized as fol-
lows (see Fig. 2): the social interactions of agents are affected
by the structural and cultural conditions (conditioning), which
are the result of past actions (T1—marking the analytical
starting point of understanding processes of change). There
is not a deterministic relation between structure and agency;
in social interactions, agents have at least some degree of
independent power to affect events in social interactions
(T2–T3). This might result in changing conditions. This pro-
cess of elaboration (or reproduction) is a result that no group
or individual could foresee beforehand but emerges as the
outcome of conflict or compromise. The changed structural
and cultural context marks the beginning of a new circle of
change (T4 is the new T1 of the next cycle of conditioning–
interactions–elaboration). But in many cases, events leave
conditions relatively unchanged, or actions fail to bring about
desired changes (process of morphostasis) (Archer 2010b).
Using marine scaping as a conceptual lens in the study of
reflexive governance in TMSP helps to better understand the
ways and extent to which (T)MSP can follow new courses of
action and become connected to different logics and dis-
courses, if and how a governance arrangement is (becoming)
reflexive.
Studies of a reflexive turn in (marine) environmental gov-
ernance are associated with social theorists as Beck and
Giddens (Beck et al. 1994; Giddens 1990; Beck, 2009; Mol
2008; Boström et al. 2017; van Tatenhove 2017; Feindt and
Weiland 2018). Beck’s notion of “reflexive modernization”
refers, to put it shortly, to a social order that is characterized
by profound uncertainties and wide-reaching unintended con-
sequences. Governance is then no longer aimed at problem-
solving, but at problem-handling (Voß et al. 2006). Giddens
highlights the importance of information in reflexive modern-
ization: “social practices are constantly examined and re-
formed in the light of incoming information about those very
practices, thus constitutively altering their character” (Giddens
1990: 38). Information is here, again, defined as a formative
force. However, whether this force is for better or for worse
depends, at least partly, on the ability of actors to (re)consider
and change habitual action (“reflection”), and to handle (the
idea of) one’s unknowing (“self-confrontation”) (cf. Beck
et al. 2009).
This leads to the other addition to our original framework,
which is to focus on capabilities, generally defined as the
ability of actors to perform actions at one’s discretion, so
representing their effective freedom to act (cf. Sen 1997;
Jentoft et al. 2010). To better understand capabilities in the
context of reconciling spatial claims at sea, we draw on the
work of Sassen (2006, 2009, 2013). Although her work is on
cities, Sassen provides an analytical perspective on bordering
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capabilities by which non-state actors are able to shape bor-
dered spaces transversal to traditional state borders, which can
be applied also on the marine domain. Sassen’s idea of “trans-
versal bordering capabilities” refers to the ability to steer and
control cross-border flows of money, goods, and information.
Her central thesis is “that opening of traditional national bor-
ders may, in fact, strengthen a range of transversal bordering
capabilities—transversal in the sense that these capabilities cut
across traditional borders and enter and exist deep inside na-
tional institutional spaces” (Sassen 2008: 596). Transversally
bordered spaces are not merely cross-border flows, but are
constitutive of distinct territories. These bordering capabilities
can be mobilized for a broad range of dynamics, including
some with scale-up potentials that can unsettle the territorial
authority of the state. Sassen states that territory, as an analytic
category, cannot be confined to its national instantiation; it
should be conceived as a complex capability, because then it
shows to have more meanings than are signaled by prevalent
notions of territoriality. Transversally bordered spaces
deborder territoriality—that singular encasement which
Fig. 2 The marine scaping
framework and the
morphogenetic approach.
Derived from Toonen and Van
Tatenhove 2013: 47
Fig. 1 Marine scaping: the interplay of humanscape with seascape and mindscape
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constitutes it as national territory. In so doing, a focus on
territory makes conditions, that are at risk of remaining blurry
in the shadow of national/state territoriality, legible. The ca-
pability to make borderings has itself switched organizing
logics: from institutionalizing the perimeter of a territory to
multiplying transversal borderings cutting across that perime-
ter (Sassen 2008: 571). While Sassen (2013: 31) in her work
on cities argues that transversally bordered spaces entail the
making of distinct, albeit elementary territories and jurisdic-
tions inside nation states, our focus here goes beyond or out-
side a single nation state. Nevertheless, it is of value to explore
if Sassen’s concept works out in the research field of marine
governance: given the institutional ambiguity in the marine
realm, all actors, state and non-state, can be expected to have
transversal bordering capabilities; however, to what extent is a
question open for research.
In bringing reflexivity and capabilities together in the
marine scaping framework, it is useful to follow Donati
(2010, 2011) who distinguished between personal reflexivity
(a deep “self-conversation”) and social reflexivity (insights
evolving in/from interaction between actors when they seek
to accommodate not only one’s own interests and concerns
(see Fig. 3). Building upon Archer’s ideas about reflexivity
(Archer 2007), Donati argues that reflexivity is not only a
reactive process (as described by Beck et al. (1994)) but “a
capacity for reorientation and redirection, helping to build up
new structures (…)” (Donati 2010: 144). Next to personal and
social reflexivity, Donati also defines systemic reflectivity,
refering to the sociocultural structures and their interactive
parts, that is if reflexivity has pertained to structural and cul-
tural conditions, and becomes an elaboration emerging from
personal and social reflexivity in the social interactions
(Donati 2010).
In line with the morphogenetic approach, as visualized
in Fig. 2, we can thus state that maritime activities in a
globalized society are mediated by different modes of re-
flexivity practiced by actors in their mutual interactions
under the constraints of structural and cultural condition-
ing (T1). At T2, we can observe actors who might have
different (transversal) bordering capabilities in social in-
teractions, in the context of T1. In these interactions (T2-
T3) personal reflexivity elaborates the informational inter-
actions between actors, and social reflexivity can broaden
or deepen these interactions. The new conditions emerg-
ing at T4 depend on the extent to which reflexivity has
been developed between T2 and T3.
While Donati (2010) describes personal and social reflex-
ivity, there is no clear insight in the extent to which the con-
ditions of reflexivity are affected. This is however important
for the understanding if and how a TMSP is (becoming)
Fig. 3 Marine scaping and
informational interactions
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reflexive: the final assessment is the extent to which elabora-
tion or morphostatis occurs. According to Van Tatenhove
(2017), a reflexive governance arrangement for TMSP is both
when actors are able to make use of different rule systems in
order to change the institutional rules in which the arrange-
ment is embedded (structural congruence, cf. Boonstra 2004)
and the existing discursive space of a policy domain has been
challenged (performative mobilization, cf. Pestman 2001). As
such, reflexivity involves the recognition that governance sub-
ject and object—the governance system and the area of
intervention—are so constituted through a recursive mutual
contingency of subjective representations and interventions
(Hertin 2016; Stirling et al. 2006). In other words, Van
Tatenhove (2017) refers to a reflexive arrangement only if
personal reflexivity and social reflexivity go beyond interac-
tions and result in both structural and cultural elaboration (so
in Donati’s words, when systemic reflectivity occurs).
By using the typology of Van Tatenhove (2017), we
distinguish three modes of reflexivity, representing differ-
ent extents: structural and performative reflectiveness, and
reflexivity. These three modes are possible outcomes of a
process of marine scaping (see Fig. 4). Structural
reflectiveness refers to the ability of actors to use rules
and resources from different institutional settings within
a given discursive space of a policy domain, but actors are
not able to change the rules of the game. The dominant
form of mobilization of actors is action-oriented1 within
an existing governance setting. Despite informational in-
teractions, conditions remain relatively unchanged (in
Archer’s terms, a process of morphostatis). Performative
reflectiveness refers to the ability of actors to challenge
the discursive space of a governance arrangement (perfor-
mative mobilization)2, resulting in for example alternative
discourses, and related new coalitions, rules and resources
existing side by side with the existing governance ar-
rangement, but existing institutional rules and power rela-
tions (polity) are not challenged. As such, informational
interactions fostered personal and social reflexivity
leading to cultural elaboration, or the reproduction of the
interplay between mindscape and humanscape. Van
Tatenhove (2017) speaks of reflexivity when actors both
challenge the existing discursive space of a policy do-
main, and are able to change the institutional rules (struc-
tural congruence)3, which thus refers to a process of mor-
phogenesis (structural and cultural elaboration).
Fig. 4 Marine scaping and elaboration: structural and cultural reflectiveness and reflexivity
1 Action-oriented mobilization is a form of mobilization where actors try to
increase their political opportunities by mobilizing resources, applying rules,
or forming coalitions within a certain institutional setting (Pestman 2001).
2 Performative mobilization is a form of mobilization in which the discursive
space of a policy domain is challenged (Pestman 2001). As a result, new
coalitions are made possible and new rules and resources may become rele-
vant. A discursive space consists of accepted conceptualizations, categoriza-
tions, and problem definitions of a socially and politically debated policy
theme. The discursive space determines the actor’s political opportunity for
maneuvering, since it legitimizes the relevance of relationships between actors,
rules, and resources.
3 In general, congruence means sufficient coherence or similarity between two
objects, for example, coherence between the discourses actors use or coher-
ence between the dimensions of a governance arrangement (Boonstra 2004).
Structural congruence refers to the extent to which the governance arrange-
ment as a whole is embedded in or matches the wider institutional context, or
when there is no conflict between the governance arrangement and the insti-
tutional context.
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Because each form of reflexivity (structural reflectiveness,
performative reflectiveness, and reflexivity) is mobilized in
informational interactions (T2–T3) we can identify the differ-
ent ways the discursive spaces of humanscapes and seascapes,
and the institutional rules from structural and cultural condi-
tioning have been challenged. This could shed light on alter-
native discourses for TMSP (about territory, authority, and
legitimate ways of governing and governability), as well as
the use of institutional rules from different institutional set-
tings or the changing of institutional rules governing maritime
activities (humanscape related to seascapes and mindscapes).
In other words, the possibilities of structural and cultural elab-
oration (or reproduction) leading to new or alternative
(transversally) bordered spaces is dependent on the forms of
reflexivity developed in interactions.
TMSP as marine scaping in tropical oceans
Tropical seas are covering the equatorial midsection, generally
positioned between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of
Capricorn (e.g., 23.5° North and South latitudes). Oceans con-
sidered to be tropical are the central Pacific, the central Atlantic,
and most of the Indian ocean, encompassing large parts of the
world’s high seas, and bordering all continents but Europe and
Antarctica (Hoyle and Duncan 2019). Tropical oceans, charac-
terized by a water temperature at or above 20 °C, play a key role
in regulating the Earth’s climate, are biologically diverse and
provide room to important and unique ecosystems (Ibid;
Soliveres et al. 2016). For example, the world’s most famous
coral reef, the Great Barrier Reef (GBR), is a tropical system.
Governance of the GBR is an early example, and often also
presented as a good practice, of applying spatial management
approaches (Day 2008; Hassan et al. 2015). In the largest parts
of the tropical oceans, MSP—as it is commonly referred to—is
however close to non-existent (Paddle project/Bonnin n.d.; Jay
et al. 2013). Ardron et al. (2008: 833) stated that “the broad
variety of existing arrangements clearly demonstrates that some
high seas management and protection is already achievable
within current arrangements, albeit in a very piecemeal fash-
ion”, but recognized that, regarding these existing arrange-
ments, “management assessments have not been conducted”
(ibid). About a decade later, this still is a valid claim.
In this section, we will present two cases to illustrate wheth-
er, and if so, how marine scaping processes in the tropical part
of our ocean can be characterized by a mode of either structural
or performative reflectiveness, or reflexivity. As cases, we se-
lected two existing arrangements: the International Seabed
Authority (ISA) and the International Commission for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). These arrangements
are intergovernmental organizations, established for the regula-
tion and control of mineral-related activities in the seabed in
areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ), respectively the
management and conservation of tuna and tuna-like species
(ISA 2019a; ICCAT 2019). Both are addressing important ma-
rine environmental issues in the tropical oceans for which spa-
tial measures are (being) discussed and implemented (see
Fig. 5). While neither will be considered an MSP arrangement
from a conventional understanding of MSP (they do not have
an exclusive or primary focus on spatial planning), we consider
marine scaping to be a key process in the overall functioning
and development of the arrangements as spatiality is of direct
Fig. 5 Geographic indication of Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) and the
spatial Conservation and Management Measure (CCM) in the extended
Gulf of Guinea, related to spatial approaches by the International Seabed
Authority (ISA) and the International Commission for the Conservation
of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), respectively. World map blank template
derived from (Wikimedia Commons 2008). Adaptions by the authors
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concern, such as in exploring and exploiting mineral-rich
grounds and protecting spawning areas and biodiversity
hotspots. Moreover, we think of these arrangements to be
nodes, or even hubs, in information networks related to marine
environmental challenges. To us, they serve as what Buscher
and Urry (2009: 108) call “transfer points”where mobilities (in
our case, information flows) are “temporarily immobilized” and
can become object of social science study. In that way, these
transfer points illuminate the transversal bordering capabilities
of actors bywhich space (or more specifically territories) can be
(re)defined and (b)ordered. Because our analysis serves a theo-
retical purpose of exploring the extent to which marine scaping
in a transboundary context bears reflexivity, our case studies are
based on a desk study of available literature, policy documents,
secondary sources (particularly Zalik (2015, 2018) for the ISA
case), and additional information publicly available (online)
such as news items, blogs, and position statements.
International Seabed Authority (ISA)
Seabed mining in the deep and the high seas is a specific pro-
cess of marine scaping, i.e. ordering and regulation of mining
activities (the exploration and exploitation of the extracting of
minerals and energy sources from the seabed) in vulnerable
marine ecosystems (humanscape–seascape). These activities in-
cludematerials such as polymetallic sulphides, manganese nod-
ules, cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, methane hydrates, and
the potential mining of rare earth elements. Core of the seabed
mining arrangement is the International Seabed Authority
(ISA), which regulates and manages seabed mining at the high
seas, i.e., beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. ISA is an
UN agency4, consisting of the Assembly, the Council, the
Financial Committee, and the Legal and Technical
Commission (LTC). The Assembly consists of 168 member
states, which are divided in regional groups5. Observer groups
consists of non-member states, at this moment thirty countries
including the United States of America (USA); UN and inter-
governmental organizations; and non-state organizations, in-
cluding eNGOs, i.e., Conservation International, Greenpeace,
and theWorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF), and also research
centers and industry alliances like the World Ocean Council
(ISA 2019b).
The LTC is responsible for reviewing mining applications,
the supervision of exploration or mining activities, and the as-
sessment of the environmental impact of such activities.
Besides ISA, the seabed mining arrangements consists of firms
(both private and state) who want to exploit minerals and
resources from the seabed and eNGOs. The humanscape of this
arrangement consists of the political and regulatory institutional
context as defined by UNCLOS and the claims of mining com-
panies. The mindscape of seabed mining, i.e., the way actors
define seabed mining, and the knowledge needed revolves
around competing approaches to maritime law: “the deep sea-
bed is divergently represented as null versus common property”
(Zalik 2018; 2). “Terra nullius” or no-man’s land refers to the
position that everybody has free access to and can claim the
marine resources in ABNJ. The “common property” discourse
implies that marine resources and the ABNJ are common her-
itage of humankind and everybody should have equal access to
them. The “common property” discourse is the core principle of
ISA. UNCLOS (Art. 145) stipulates that ISA is required to take
necessarymeasures to ensure effective protection for themarine
environment from harmful effects which may arise from min-
ing activities in “the Area”6, that is, the seabed and the interna-
tional waters beyond state jurisdiction. To realize this common
property ideal, UNCLOS (Art. 153) has defined the “the par-
allel system”. This parallel system refers to the principle that in
case of polymetallic nodules an application must be sufficiently
larger and of sufficient value to accommodate two mining op-
erations of “equal estimated commercial value”. One part is to
be allocated to the applicant and the other is to become reserved
area. These reserved areas are set aside for activities by devel-
oping states or by the Authority through its Enterprise and is
managed by the signatory states of UNCLOS via the ISA.
However, research activities in the area are marked by geopo-
litical tensions between the Global North and South and un-
equal power positions related to historical claims of private
contractors before UNCLOS came into force (for an extensive
overview, see Zalik 2018).
By example of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) we
analyze the process of marine scaping and the possibility of
reflexivity in seabed mining as a process of marine scaping.
The CCZ is a seabed area of about 6 million km2 in ABNJ in
the Eastern Central Pacific Ocean (see Fig. 5). The CCZ is
considered as a prime location for commercial exploration and
exploitation of polymetallic nodules. Although scientific ex-
ploration and prospecting research has been conducted since
the 1960s, no commercial exploration has yet taken place
(Lodge et al. 2014).
The development of the Environmental Management Plan
for the CCZ by ISA’s LTC can be seen as a form of (non-state
4 Mandated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) and the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part
XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5 ISA regional groups are African group, Asian-Pacific group, Eastern
European group, Latin-American and Caribbean States, Western European,
and other states (ISA 2019a).
6 “To this end the Authority shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations, and
procedures for inter alia: (a) the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution
and other hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and of
interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment, particular
attention being paid to the need for protection from harmful effects of such
activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, construction and
operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines and other devices related to
such activities; (b) the protection and conservation of the natural resources of
the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine
environment.” (UNCLOS, art. 145)
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directed) MSP in the high seas. In 2010, the LTC organized a
workshop with marine reserve and management specialists to
discuss and draft a management plan for the CCZ, which was
decided upon in 2011. This plan divided CCZ spatially in
three strata for conservation management. The plan included,
besides areas for exploration of polymetallic nodules, also the
possibility of the establishment of a network of protected
areas, called Areas of Particular Environmental Interest
(APEI). The plan formulated scientific design principles of
APEIs, also incorporating flexibility (ability to modify the
location and size of the APEI, based on for example, improved
information about the location of mining activities) (ISA
2011: 6–8). On 26 July 2012, ISA approved the
Environmental Management Plan for the CZZ to be imple-
mented in three years, including the designation (on a provi-
sional basis) of a network of APEIs (ISA 2012). Nine APEIs
in different bio-geographic sub-regions were designated, with
a protected area of 400 km × 400 km, placing roughly 25% of
the whole CCZ management area under protection. The
Council noted in its decision that, by designating APEIs, the
precautionary approach as called for by the Regulations had
been put in place and decided that for a period of five years, no
application for exploration rights should be granted in these
protected areas.
Currently, 16 contractors have been granted exploration
licenses for the CCZ (see Annex 1). Some of these contractors
are successor firms to the pioneer investors who had been given
exclusive rights to undertake “pioneer activities”. For example,
LockheedMartin has an exploration permit for the CCZ7, hold-
ing only rights under the US law. TheUSA, an observer in ISA,
has not ratified UNCLOS, but allows, also through agreements
with other states, US companies to capitalize on their first mov-
er advantage (Zalik 2018). Moreover, greater access to capital
as well as proprietary data keep these companies in pole posi-
tion (Ibid.). Although UNCLOS is promoting information ex-
change, when considered commercially sensitive data, there is
much room for exceptions, which especially benefits those with
longstanding experience and strong research connections, like
Lockheed Martin that can play the role “as purveyor of data to
competing firms” (Ibid.: 347).
Another tension expressed in informational processes relates
to the lack of a comprehensive approach to marine conserva-
tion. International debates on marine biodiversity run parallel to
ISA’s development of its extractive regime. While ISA explo-
ration contracts require firms to carry out ecological research,
including a baseline study, this research does not need to in-
clude, or provide, the requisite data needed to meaningfully
measure impact (Zalik 2018). According to the LTC, there is
a lack of raw data associated with environment baseline studies,
while data are also considered to be of insufficient quantity and
quality impeding the validity of a regional environmental man-
agement plan (Lodge et al. 2014: 69). The concern of eNGOs is
that proceeding with seabed mining in the absence of detailed
knowledge is contrary to the precautionary principle. For ex-
ample, in 2018, the European-wide, Brussels-based NGO
“Seas at Risks” demanded the Belgian government and ISA
to conduct a public consultation regarding the exploration con-
tract of the Belgian company Global Sea Mineral Resources
(GSR), in particular the environmental impact assessment re-
lated to a mining equipment test (Seas at Risk 2018a). Seas at
Risk stated that the procedure was unclear but succeeded to get
their request granted by the Belgian authorities, which orga-
nized an open consultation and reviewed GSR’s impact assess-
ment (FPS Economy 2018; Seas at Risk 2018b). Seven com-
ments (all Belgian but one) were received of which two were
rejected; the other five were separately addressed. The Belgian
government issued an overall response in which it recognized
the problem of knowledge gaps, stating “knowledge gained
from this test is important in order to set the bar for environ-
mental standards as high as possible” (Government 2018: 3). It
set out several action points, including the request to GSR to
revise its executive summary of its assessment report. It also
recommended to GSR to make parts of annual reports publicly
available, recognizing that the Belgian government itself “is
bound, as a member of ISA, to follow the confidentiality rules”
(Ibid: 2). Also, the response refers to an announcementmade by
the LTC chair to set up a workgroup to consider the review
process of an environmental impact assessments in the future
(ibid: 3).
Governance by ISA, at least in case of CCZ, can be char-
acterized as a form of structural reflectiveness. Marine scaping
is predominantly affected by persistent and longstanding pow-
er relations, particularly showing transversal capabilities of
pioneer firms in steering informational processes. They use
historical rules and their first mover advantage, based on
rights granted before the negotiations and ratification of
UNCLOS to maneuver within the ISA arrangement. While
this can be considered a rather morphostatic process, the es-
tablishment of the Environmental Plan including APEIs does
affect the interplay between seascape and humanscape.
Furthermore, the open consultation regarding the GSR explo-
ration contract shows the ability of eNGOs to apply proce-
dures common in a different governance setting, e.g.,
Belgium, to mobilize an ISA member to improve working
practices in the arrangement.
International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
The International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is one of the five Regional
7 The USA developed its own legislation on deep sea mining, the 1980 Deep
SeabedMinerals Resources Act. Based on this act and because the USA set up
agreements with “reciprocating states” (such as the UK, France, and
Germany), Lockheed got an exploration permit for the CCZ (Zalik 2018).
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Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs8) focusing on
tuna and tuna-like species. ICCAT entered into force in 1969,
and its main goal is to make recommendations to its
Contracting Parties about the design, implementation, and
control of fishing effort limits and technical measures, which
may include spatial management. Many tuna stocks managed
by ICCAT are fully exploited or overfished, such as bigeye,
yellowfin, and bluefin tuna. Tuna (and tuna-like) species are
highly migratory, which means that marine scaping (more
specifically the interplay of seascape–humanscape) relates to
the whole convention area, which spans the Atlantic Ocean
and adjacent seas. Given the high commercial value of tuna,
ICCAT has 53 Contracting Parties (52 nation states and the
European Union), so including distant water fishing nations
(ICCAT n.d.). There are five cooperating non-Contracting
Parties, both Atlantic countries as well as distant water fishing
nations (Ibid). At ICCAT’s core is scientific and technical
information “on the abundance, biometry and ecology of the
fishes; the oceanography of their environment; and the effects
of natural and human factors upon their abundance” (ICCAT
2019, Art. IV), resulting in an organizational emphasis on
committees tasked with collecting, compiling, and reviewing
available scientific data (Fig. 6; interplay mindscape –
humanscape). Moreover, eNGOs are eligible for (long-term)
observer status since 1998 (ICCAT 2005). In the past, ICCAT
has been heavily criticized for prioritizing economic interests
(advocated by a strong EU “friends-of-fishing” coalition, cf.
Belschner 2015) and accused of disregarding information
from its own scientific advisors, particularly regarding bluefin
tuna (BBC news and Black 2008;Mongabay and Hance 2009;
WWF 2013). Currently, ICCAT seems to grow a more pro-
sustainability attitude (Belschner 2015). However, WWFwho
holds ICCAT observer status, stated to be very disappointed
by the outcomes of ICCAT’s 2018 meeting, again claiming
scientific advice is being ignored (SeafoodSource 2018;
WWF 2018).
Boerder et al. (2019) state that given the highly mo-
bile nature of tuna, spatial management has not received
much scientific attention in general, but ICCAT seems a
frontrunner, by its recognition of the potential of “dy-
namic zoning” or “flexible spatial management” for tuna
governance. Zoning is considered a key management
measure in MSP (cf. Kenchington and Day 2011), so
by focusing on discussions of spatial Conservation and
Management Measures (CMMs) by Panel 1 (tropical
tunas), we here elaborate on the process of marine scap-
ing and the reflexive mode of governance by ICCAT.
In the early 2000s, ICCAT started discussing spatial
CMMs, like seasonal (e.g., related to spawning) and gear-
specific closings for reducing fishing pressure on tropical tu-
na. This resulted in a one-month area closing for bigeye tuna
fishing in 2004 (ICCAT Rec. 04–01). The closed area can be
roughly defined as an extended Gulf of Guinea, a
transboundary area covering (parts of) the EEZs of Liberia,
Ivory Coasts, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon,
and ABNJ (see Fig. 5). In 2008, Recommendations 04–01
were replaced, implying a decrease of the area and an increase
of the closing season (to three months; ICCAT Rec. 08–01),
followed in 2011 by adjustment in seasonal and gear-specific
closing, an addition to also protect yellowfin juveniles, and a
change in area and time (two-month closure, ICCATRec. 11–
01).
According to Hobday et al. (2010) CMMs require regular,
up-to-date information and/or predictions to be successfully
implemented. In 2011, it was noted “that the SCRS does not
have the data necessary to fully evaluate options for area/time
closures and to propose precise relevant recommendations”
(ICCAT Rec. 11–01); while in 2014, ICCAT was
“EXPRESSING GRAVE CONCERN about the difficulties en-
countered by the Standing Committee on Research and
Statistics (SCRS) in investigating the state of the stocks of
tropical tunas from the Convention area and to fully evaluate
options for area/time closures and propose precise relevant
recommendations because of the lack of reliable data collec-
tion mechanisms by some CPCs” (ICCAT Rec. 14–01, p. 1;
Italics in original). In 2015, the SCRS had concluded that area/
time closure has not been, or only minimally, effective be-
cause of increased effort into areas adjacent to the closed area
(ICCAT 2015). This did however not result in dismissing the
CMM. The new Recommendations showed an adjustment in
area size back to the 2008 parameters, and skipjack tuna were
added as protected species (ICCAT Rec. 15–01). In
Recommendations 16–01, which are currently in force, the
area/time closure remains in place with no change in condi-
tions compared to 2015 (ICCAT 2016). The area/time closure
was to be evaluated in 2019 (ICCAT Rec. 16–01).
ICCAT recognized the need to also adopt monitoring
and control measures to effectuate the area/time closure.
In 2012, a port sampling programme was developed to
monitor compliance, and in 2014, an observer programme
has been put in place, setting coverage of national ob-
servers on a minimum of 5% of the fishing effort, which
is now increased to 100% coverage (ICCAT 2016).
Moreover, Ghana whose small-scale fisheries are largely
affected by the area/time closure had been participating as
one of the two pilot countries in the Common Oceans
ABNJ Tuna Project. This project focused on the use of
Electronic Monitoring Systems, and was a joint effort of
WWF, the International Seafood Sustainability Foundation
(ISSF), the Ghanaian tuna industry, the Ghanian
8 RFMOs are mandated under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
(UNFSA). Tuna RFMOs can be considered specialized RFMOs, while there
are also general (so non-species specific) RFMOs.
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government, and the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) (FAO 2018, 2019).
The subsequent Recommendations and the discussions in
ICCAT’s Panel 1 also show a growing recognition that the
impact of increased use of particular gear (fishing aggregation
devices; FADs) has to be addressed, although members agree
“that more input from the SCRS is required to determine the
best options for managing FADs” (ICCAT 2018b: 3). This
could read as an expression of the precautionary principle.
Generally, ICCAT indeed seems to move to more broad and
holistic deliberations, e.g., by recognizing the need for multi-
species management, and developing a pilot ecosystem plan
for the Atlantic Tropical Region (ICCAT 2018a). Spatial
CMM remain part of possible measures, and discussions also
address how these relate to other measures. In the last Panel 1
meeting, for example, El Salvador suggested extensive
Atlantic-wide area/time closure as an alternative to setting a
Total Allowable Catch (TAC). In response, a scientific expert
recalled results from previous SCRS analysis, stating “If the
fleets harvest more during the open season to make up for the
lost catch during the closure, then any potential benefits would
be offset by this additional effort” (ICCAT 2018a: 3).
The governance mode expressed by ICCAT can be
assessed as a form of performative reflectiveness. The discur-
sive space of ICCAT reflects willingness to adapt to new
insights, at least to some extent, shown by the implementation
and refinement of the spatial CCM in the Gulf of Guinea and
by the related port sampling and observer programmes and the
pilot ecosystem plan for the Atlantic Tropical Region. Also,
the fact that documentation including meeting reports are pub-
licly available opens up possibilities for personal and social
reflexivity, also by non-ICCAT states, observers, and others.
Furthermore, the Ghanian pilot study in the Common Oceans
ABNJ Tuna Project points to the transversal capabilities of
different public and private actors forming a new coalition
(with new resources) existing side-by-side ICCAT.
Discussion
Our cases represent two governance arrangements in the high
seas, the largest part of the world’s oceans, where MSP as it is
commonly defined, seems to be merely absent. By using ma-
rine scaping as an analytical framework, we bring informa-
tional (rather than state) processes to the fore, so to better
scrutinize the spatial approaches and processes developed to
improve environmental management in ABNJ, which is often
described as uncharted territory. This informational focus
demonstrates reconciliation of human use and nature protec-
tion by the delineation of protected areas as part of deep sea-
bed mining governance, governed by ISA, and the spatio-
temporal allocation of tuna fisheries by ICCAT. It also em-
phasizes processes of territorialization in transboundary areas,
in which states play an important role, yet side-by-side non-
state actors. States are engaged through a public process (ISA
and ICCAT are mandated by the UN), but also bound by
strong economic interests. In ISA, some nation states act as
close allies of big international companies. The CCZ case
shows how nation-specific rules or practices, such as on reg-
ulation on data protection (US-Lockheed Martin) or public
consultation (Belgium-GSR) affect informational processes
in the deep seabed mining arrangement. ICCAT‘s convention
area also spans EEZs, so there is clear state responsibility
defined for monitoring and surveillance, such as the West-
and Central African countries in the above-discussed spatial
CMM in the Gulf of Guinea. However, tuna fishing is a global
Fig. 6 Organigram Commission
Structure. Derived from (ICCAT
n.d.-a.)
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billion dollar industry, and large parts of catch quota are held
by distant water fishing nations (for example, the EU is in the
top three for big eye tuna). The NGO critique that member
states (still) ignore scientific advice points to a strong econom-
ic rationality, and a more skeptic reader might indeed think of
the panel decisions to wait for more scientific input as
delaying tactics in favor of short-term economic benefits.
This paper presents a theoretical elaboration of marine
scaping as presented in earlier work (Toonen and van
Tatenhove 2013), by incorporating the concepts of capabili-
ties and reflexivity. Sassen’s transversal bordering capabilities
make it possible to get insight and to explain the process of
scaping (the ordering of maritime activities in time and space
as the interplay of the three scapes) in more depth, by focusing
on the capacity of actors to make borderings beyond and out-
side the territories and authority of nation states. More gener-
ally, by incorporating capabilities in the marine scaping
framework, processes of territorialization become explicitly
linked to an understanding of marine environmental gover-
nance as highly networked and increasingly driven by high-
tech developments and democratization of knowledge. The
two cases show different transversal capabilities of actors. In
the deep seabed-mining case, companies that are granted li-
cense to exploit the CCZ are big multi- and/or international
players who are able to mobilize technological expertise to
explore possible exploitation in this area far out, and deep
in, the ocean. The mining industry, especially pioneer firms,
possesses what Zalik (2018) calls “first mover advantage”
because they hold proprietary knowledge of the Area, have
invested in ecological data (which are not automatically
shared), and are able to make use of historical rules to
strengthen their position within the mining governance ar-
rangement. While this refers to acting within traditional
state-based structures, smart shifting, and combining of these
resources makes it possible for these firms not only to steer
and govern the interplay of seascape and humanscape, but also
to define its bordering. The ICCAT case also shows examples
of transversal capabilities. In the Ghanian pilot study in the
Common Oceans ABNJ Tuna Project, different public and
private actors have demonstrated the ability to form a new
international coalition and to seek new ways to improve trans-
parency by integrating (new) electronic monitoring in fisher-
ies management. Also for ICCAT itself, (increased) transpar-
ency can be seen as a way to cut across traditional ways of
working. Moreover, WWF is, by both collaborating with, and
criticizing ICCAT member states, an example of the role
NGOs are often considered to play well in marine environ-
mental governance, that is, to promote spatial approaches
while also traversing national borders (Calado et al. 2012;
Campbell et al. 2016; Parmentier 2012).
Secondly, by following Van Tatenhove’s argument that
reflexivity as governing principle is essential to (T)MSP, ma-
rine scaping also gained explanatory power in its diachronic
analysis. By distinguishing different forms of reflexivity
(structural reflectiveness, performative reflectiveness, and re-
flexivity), it is possible to analyze and to explain how and
under what conditions the discursive spaces of an arrangement
are challenged and what the possibilities are to challenge in-
stitutional rules and to introduce new ones. The two cases
show different developments of marine scaping (in the sense
of different elaborations of sea- and mindscapes with the
humanscape), due to different forms of reflexivity9. The pos-
sibilities of governing deep seabed mining activities is shaped
by structural reflectiveness. Firms are capable of using histor-
ical rules next to the rules of ISA but are not able to change the
rules of the ISA arrangement. Governance in the ICCAT case
is affected by performative reflectiveness. The examples of
the implementation and refinement of the spatial CCM in
the Gulf of Guinea and the pilot ecosystem plan for the
Atlantic Tropical Region show possibilities to change discur-
sive space of ICCAT.
Conclusions
MSP processes in transboundary areas, such as ABNJ but also
in regional seas, need to be defined in a way that captures its
most dominant explanatory factor, which we argue is the in-
terplay between information and reflexivity rather than the
dominant planning authority of nation states. In that way, we
can understand MSP to come about in various guises, as com-
plex power processes that go beyond the formal and expect-
able. By selecting our cases from a different and largely un-
explored empirical reality, the tropical seas, we aimed to dem-
onstrate that if (T)MSP is defined differently, we come to
understand nation states as one of many actors and not neces-
sarily the ones steering planning processes, allowing to get a
fuller picture of how planning processes at sea work out, spe-
cifically about the extent to which a broad range of actors is
able to affect reflexivity in (T)MSP arrangements. The ISA
case about the exploitation of the CCZ shows in particular that
non-state actors (e.g., Lockheed Martin and Seas at Risk) are
deliberately drawing on state authority rather than being di-
rected by it.
Within territorial waters, MSP is very much state driven
and is presented as an instrument to deal with handling both
9 We recognize that our analysis has been based on desk study only, which
served the purpose of this paper, but limits the level of detail in which the
personal and social reflexivity in informational interactions have been studied.
The work by Zalik (2015, 2018), here used as secondary source, is however
based on interview data and has shed light on particularly personal reflexivity
of participants of the ISA arrangement related to the CCZ. The documentation,
including meeting reports, made publically available by ICCAT provided
some more insights in discussions and deliberations, as such in the social
reflexivity. For future research and closer assessments, we suggest data col-
lection methods like interviewing and participatory observation will be very
useful and insightful to further scrutinize personal and social reflexivity.
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environment–user and user–user conflicts. When moving to
the high seas, the processes of spatial ordering and staging
changes from balancing these conflicts, or even predominant-
ly managing multi-use conflicts, to a focus on environment–
user conflicts. These conflicts are being dealt with in sectoral
arrangements, like ISA and ICCAT, confirming the claim by
Ardron et al. (2008) that high sea management is uncoordi-
nated. We are however more reserved when considering their
plea for high-level global support and coordination, particu-
larly that a UN body “with a broad mandate to ensure coordi-
nation, coherence and cooperative action” should be
established and “agreed overarching governance rules” are
to be developed (Ardron et al. 2008: 837). Our two cases show
no sign of multi-use conflicts10 and other clear examples in the
high seas are also lacking, so to increase focus on user–user
conflicts by installing a high-level body does not seem in line
with today’s reality. Althoughwe agree cumulative impacts of
multiple uses (e.g., Freestone et al. 2014) and potential/future
conflicts in (tropical) transboundary areas deserve more scru-
tiny, we still question whether a meta-agency for TMSP on the
global level would be desirable. A key pitfall is that this em-
phasizes (again) traditional ordering based on state authority
rather than the transversal bordering capabilities of non-state
actors, and networked environmental governance (cf. Gray
2018). Also, marine scaping by a meta-agency runs the risk
of particularly leaning towards the interplay of mind- and
humanscape, as informational processes in a high-level ap-
proach become footloose from particular seascapes to serve
the purpose of feeding into all-compassing principles (cf.
Kidd and Shaw 2014). This would be in contrast with our
understanding that it is actually structural elaboration that re-
flects change in the ways in which the marine environment is
used and protected.
Attention should go to designing ways to increase, support,
and secure reflexivity in existing arrangements, and their
interlinkages, especially since we wish to bring the environ-
ment to the forefront. But then new conceptualizations to un-
derstand spatial allocation in transboundary areas, including
the high seas, are needed. The marine scaping framework,
enriched with the concepts of capabilities and reflexivity, pro-
vides new insights because it explains processes of change
and stability in more depth by emphasizing the abilities of
actors in informational interactions to change the rules of the
game and discursive spaces, resulting in changing structural
and cultural conditions (elaboration). Understanding (T)MSP
as marine scaping makes it therefore possible to, firstly, ana-
lyze and explain the role of state and non-state actors and their
relations with the seascape and, secondly, assess the perfor-
mative force of information and reflexivity.
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Annex 1: Contractors in CCZ
– ChinaMinmetals Corporation. (China). ContractMay 12,
2017–May 11, 2032
– Cook Islands Investment Corporation (Cook Islands).
Contract: July 15, 2016–July 14, 2031
– UK Seabed Resources Ltd. (UK) Contract: March 29,
2016–March 28, 2031 (CCZ II)
– Ocean Mineral Singapore Pte Ltd. (Singapore) Contract
January 22, 2015–January 21, 2030
– UK Seabed Resources Ltd. (UK) Contract: February 8,
2013–February 7, 2028 (CCZ I)
– Global Sea Mineral Resources NV (Belgium), Contract:
January 14, 2013–January 13, 2028
– Marawa Research and Exploration Ltd. (Kiribati).
Contract: January 19, 2015–January 18, 2030
– Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (Tonga). Contract:
January 11, 2012–January 10, 2027
– Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (Nauru). Contract: July 22,
2011–July 21, 2026
– Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources
of Germany (Germany). Contract: July 19, 2006–July 18,
2021
– Institut français de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer
(France). Contract: June 20, 2001–June 19, 2016.
Extension: June 20, 2016–June 19, 2021
– Deep Ocean Resources Development Co. Ltd.(Japan).
Contract: June 20, 2001–June 19, 2016. Extension:
June 20, 2016–June 19, 2021
– China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and
Development Association (China). Contract: May 22,
2001–May 21, 2016. Extension: May 22, 2016–May
21, 2021
– Government of the Republic of Korea (Republic of
Korea). Contract:April 27, 2001–April 26, 2016.
Extension: April 27, 2016–April 26, 2021
– JSC Yuzhmorgeologiya (Russian Federation). Contract:
March 29, 2001–March 28, 2016. Extension: March 29,
2016–March 28, 2021
– Interoceanmetal Joint Organization (Bulgaria, Cuba,
Czech Republic, Poland, Russian Federation, and
Slovakia). Contract: March 29, 2001–March 28, 2016.
Extension: March 29, 2016–March 28, 2021
10 Except for multi-species considerations in ICCAT, as also indicated by
Ardron et al. 2008
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